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The present paper aims at an analysis of the coherence of 
the European Union’s policy output in the field of Access 
and Benefit-Sharing, in the nexus between the Convention 
on Biological Diversity, the World Intellectual Property 
Organization and the Agreement on Trade-related Aspects 
of Intellectual Property Rights. As some preliminary data 
suggests, during 2006, the EU approach to ABS was 
fundamentally reorganized. The paper sets out to test 
whether such a reorganization can be found at the level of 
policy coherence. Statistical analysis suggests, that with 
one of two measures for policy coherence, a rupture 
around 2006 can be observed. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Genetic resources have been regulated by international regimes since the 1960s, 
although a comprehensive system did not emerge until the beginning of the 1990s. 
This system currently consists of five primary regimes: the Convention on Biological 
Diversity (CBD), the Agreement on Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights (WTO-TRIPS), the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), the 
International Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants (UPOV) and the 
International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture (FAO – 
treaty). This system has famously been dubbed the “regime complex” for plant 
genetic resources (Raustiala and Victor 2004). It is characterized by significant 
functional overlaps between the basal regimes, which are, amongst themselves, not 
hierarchically ordered. 
The term Access and Benefit-Sharing (ABS) of genetic resources refers to the way in 
which national states grant third parties access to genetic resources on the basis of a 
contract that specifies the compensation the respective state (or the respective 
indigenous community) receives from the third party. The current international 
negotiations on ABS encompass such diverse issues as a potentially mandatory 
disclosure of origin of genetic resources in patent applications, protection of 
Traditional Knowledge as well as international standards for domestic implementation 
clarifying access to genetic resources. An ABS protocol for the CBD is currently in 
the final phase of negotiation. These negotiations are generally characterized by a 
marked North-South divide due to fundamentally differing interests. Northern 
industrialized countries (especially the JUSCANZ group, that is, Japan, USA2, 
Canada, Australia, New Zealand) tend towards an emphasis of Intellectual Property 
Rights (IPRs) in the governance of genetic resources; whereas southern actors (such 
as the African Union Group, the like-minded group of megadiverse countries and  
GRULAC), being primarily providers of genetic resources, emphasis the 
compensatory mechanisms entailed in benefit-sharing arrangements (Brand and 
Goerg 2006; Brand 2008). 	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  US	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Within this North-South divide, the European Union (EU) occupies a middle ground. 
Although the economic interests of the European Life-sciences and biotechnology 
industries are represented in the EU’s policy on ABS, the European approach is 
nevertheless substantially based on multilateralism and a careful balancing of 
provider and user interests. The European Commission is currently within the lead in 
the EUs ABS policy, and in spite of significant divergences of interest between 
member states, was able to formulate a distinct and comprehensive European position. 
The present paper aims at a conceptualization of the EUs behavior within the regime 
complex. The paper sets out to test the preliminary presumption, that during 2006, the 
EU approach to ABS was fundamentally reorganized, as some data suggests (i.e. 
Interview 1, Interview 2). After the ABS negotiations nearly broke down during the 
fourth session of the CBDs ABS working group (ABSWG), and after a deadline for 
the final negotiations being in 2010 was established at COP 8 in Curitiba, 2006, the 
Commission was apparently able to overcome differences of interest between member 
states, and put itself in the forefront of the ABS negotiations. The Commisson was 
able to produce (via a lengthy scientific consultation process during 2006) a number 
of comprehensive positions on ABS, allowing it to spearhead the European approach 
to the international ABS negotiations 
To test this presumption, I will try to analyze the formal structure of the EUs 
approach under the perspective of its policy coherence. For the present case, I 
understand policy coherence as the degree to which a policy a) integrates disparate 
issues to a comprehensive whole and b) entails linking together the political 
approaches to different relevant forums. A low policy coherence will thus consist of 
diverse and disparate elements not being integrated into an overarching concept (a 
low “issue density”, see below), and approaches to the relevant forums not being 
sufficiently fine-tuned to each other. High policy coherence, on the other hand, will 
link together the issues within a given policy field under a larger, potentially strategic, 
perspective; and this policy will be pursued in a coordinated manner within the 
different relevant forums. Whereas the existence of parallel forums allows 
opportunities for “forum shopping”, (Drahos 2004; Helfer 2004; Alter and Meunier 
2006; Helfer 2009; Baumgaertner 2010; Bled 2010; De BiËvre and Thomann 2010), 
regime complexity also poses substantial problems for policy-makers (Alter and 
Meunier 2009). The existence of multiple, overlapping and non-hierarchically ordered 
forums increases the requirements for policy coherence. 
 
The central question thus is: 
 
RQ: how does the coherence of the EU’s ABS policy change from the period 
2002-2005 to 2007-2010? 
 
The time-span to be investigated ranges from 2002 until 2010. The beginning date of 
2002 was chosen since around this time, negotiations within WIPO and CBD took off, 
with WIPO’s Intergovernmental Committee on Genetic resources, Traditional 
Knowledge and Folklore (IGC), and the ABSWG of the CBD taking up work. For 
this period, I will focus on CBD, WIPO and TRIPS. I will exclude UPOV since Plant 
Variety Protection is not a central issue in the current ABS negotiations; and I will 
exclude the FAO-treaty due to its limited scope. Empirically, I will analyze the EU’s 
submissions, position papers and available session protocols for the negotiations 
within WIPO / CBD  / TRIPS. I will exclude from the corpus those passages of 
documents that do not bear direct relevance on ABS. The time span of 2002 until 
2010 will be subdivided into two distinct phases, 2002 until 2005, and 2007 until 
2010. This is due to the presumption that the European approach to ABS was 
fundamentally reorganized during 2006. Thus, what this paper seeks to test is, 
whether the EU’s submissions for the periods of 2002 – 2005 and 2007-2010 belong, 
in fact, to the same population, or whether differences between those can be observed. 
This question shall be tackled by using ANOVAs. 
First, I will measure the levels of issue density for both periods. I consider those 
micro-elements that constitute a political position as such issues. E.g., the overall EU 
approach to ABS is based on the issues “disclosure of origin of genetic resources”, 
“international access standards” etc. The numerical distribution of those issues over a 
population of the EU’s submissions, position papers and session protocols (the “issue 
density”) can give a hint as to how well the disparate micro-elements constituting the 
European policy on ABS are brought together. A rise in issue density would imply 
that overall policy becomes more coherent. A low issue density, on the other hand, 
refers to a more or less eclectic distribution of different issues over the whole 
population of submissions, position papers and session protocols. This leads to 
hypothesis 1: 
 
H1: the post-2006 issue density is higher than the pre-2006 level 
 
Secondly, I will analyze to what extent the submissions to the different forums (CBD, 
WIPO, TRIPS) are linked to each other. A prerequisite for policy coherence in this 
case is that the submissions to a given forum are coordinated with the submissions to 
the other forums. A highly coherent policy should be expected to systematically 
create links between the relevant international forums. As a proxy for this linkage, I 
will measure the amount of cross-referencing within the submission’s to a target 
regime to submissions made to other two regimes. Hypothesis 2 thus states: 
 
H2: cross-referencing within the EU’s submissions should be expected to be 
higher after 2006 than before 2006. 
 
I will proceed in several steps. Part 2 will give a short overview over the field of ABS 
and the regime complex for genetic resources. Part 3 will elaborate on the European 
Union’s (EU) external policy on ABS. Part 4 will investigate the issue density of the 
EU’s submissions, while part 5 will look at the aforementioned cross-referencing. Part 





2. The international governance of Access and Benefit-Sharing 
 
Genetic resources are used in a multitude of products today, be they medicinal, 
cosmetic or agricultural. Biotechnology today is a major industry, with revenues 
exceeding $25 billion in 2001 in the US alone. The European biotech industry is 
significantly smaller, with revenues totaling $7.5 billion, and employing 34.000 
people (also in 2001) (Ernst and Young 2002). Governance of genetic resources on 
the international level began in the 1960s, primarily by setting and clarifying 
intellectual property rights (IPRs). Through IPRs, ownership of a given genetic code 
is clarified. In genetic resources, the most common IPR is the patent. The first patent 
on a life form was granted in the US in 1980s after the Diamond vs. Chakrabarty 
case, and the development of modern biotechnology and its conflict lines have since 
been inextricably linked to the global patent system (Williams 2000).  
Within the dominant, western patent systems, life forms or “essentially biological 
processes” are not directly patentable. In those patent systems that conform to the 
TRIPS standard, plants and animals can be excluded from patentability; whereas plant 
varieties must be made subject to some other form of IPRs, e.g. through the Plant 
Variety Protection offered by UPOV. What is usually patentable, on the other hand, 
are processes for isolating components of a life form, products that are derived from a 
certain DNA code, or “microbiological processes3”  (Restaino 2002; Schertenleib 
2004).  
A significant North-South conflict exists in the governance of genetic resources. The 
geographic distribution of patents in biotechnology is geographically skewed. In 
1999, industrialized countries held 97% of global patents in biotechnology (Castle 
2009). Southern actors often make accusations of “biopiracy” to northern biotech 
firms, claiming “unauthorized commercial use of biological resources and / or 
associated traditional knowledge” (Mgbeoji 2006). The core of the problem consists 
of northern corporations acquiring genetic resources from southern countries and 
patenting them in the US, the EU or Japan, possibly circumventing national 	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regulations in the country of origin, and possibly being granted a patent on an 
application that might be in use by indigenous communities for quite a long time 
Dronamjaru makes the accusation that Northern appropriation of genetic resources 
“presents itself as a respectable business, utilizing the legal terminology of patents, 
which were specially created for a subtle and smooth robbery under the cloak of 
legality” (Dronamraju 2008). Thus it is primarily the question of patentability that 
determines the North-South conflict in genetic resources; and which leads to the 
respective international institutions being “contested regimes” (Brand and Goerg 
2006; Brand 2008). 
The present system governing genetic resources took shape at the beginning of the 
1990s with two significant events. First, the Convention on Biodiversity (CBD), 
founded in 1992, aimed at the conservation, sustainable use, and equitable sharing of 
benefits arising out of genetic resources. The CBD is generally considered as an 
agreement dominated by Southern interests (Rosendal 2006). Its origin can be traced 
back to North-South conflicts in genetic resources arising in the 1980s, when northern 
biotechnology corporations were acquiring and patenting southern genetic resources 
(which were then considered as the “common heritage of mankind”) on a large scale 
(Raustiala and Victor 2004).  During the Rio Summit, Southern actors succeeded in 
establishing a framework which would allow them to participate in the profits made 
by Northern biotechnology corporations; to regulate the conditions under which 
northern actors are granted access to genetic resources; to prevent ongoing large-scale 
loss of biodiversity; and to see to a sustainable use of genetic resources. 
To achieve this triple goal, the CBD made use of Access- and Benefit-Sharing (ABS). 
ABS is based on the principal national ownership of genetic resources occurring on a 
given territory. Access to genetic resources should, in accordance with the CBD, only 
be obtained from competent national authorities under two conditions. First, that the 
respective authority is informed beforehand on which specific resource is obtained, in 
which context and to what end. The acceptance by a nation state of a private party 
obtaining a resource under these conditions is called Prior Informed Consent (PIC). 
Secondly, the sharing of (monetary or non-monetary) benefits arising out of the 
(commercial) utilization of a resource is negotiated between the accessing party and 
the national authority on Mutually Agreed Terms (MAT), that is, in the form of a 
contract.  
Generally, the impact of the CBD on national legislation has been limited. The CBD, 
and especially the later “Bonn guidelines”, were to provide model legislation for 
national states to implement as domestic ABS frameworks. This has happened in a 
limited number of countries (in the Andean region, India, Australia, Japan), but a 
widespread impact of the CBD can currently not be witnessed. Currently ongoing are 
the negotiations for a protocol to the CBD, which is to further specify and regulate 
ABS, maybe even with binding components. These negotiations are to be concluded 
in October 2010. 
The second regime governing genetic resources emerging at the beginning of the 
1990s was the Agreement on Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPS) as a part of the World Trade Organization (WTO). Through TRIPS, minimal 
standards for governing Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) worldwide were set, with 
implementation being mandatory for WTO members. While not specifically geared 
towards genetic resources, TRIPS foresees a general patentability of genetic 
resources. Of special interest here is Art. 27.3, which has been strongly contested and 
is up for review in the TRIPS council since 1999. According to Art. 27.3, micro-
organisms, non-biological and microbiological processes are deemed patentable 
substance matter; while plants, animals and “essentially biological processes” are not 
to be patented. Some parties to the TRIPS agreement such as members of the African 
Group are fiercely opposed to any possibility of patenting life forms; but due to the 
resistance of Northern states, a substantial revision of Art. 27.3 is highly unlikely. 
Currently, progress in TRIPS is slow due to the lacking political dynamic of the Doha 
round. 
A fundamental asymmetry between CBD and TRIPS exists in their respective legal 
character. Where the CBD is currently a soft-law agreement without substantial 
enforcement mechanisms, parties to TRIPS can make use of the powerful Dispute 
Settlement Mechanism (DSM) of the WTO for ensuring compliance. This asymmetry 
also implies that, while access to genetic resources via IPRs can easily be obtained in 
the context of TRIPS, a corresponding mechanism for benefit-sharing does not have 
the same kind of legal authority.  
Interpretations over the relationship between CBD and TRIPS differ significantly. 
Whereas Northern states generally contend that there is no contradiction, some 
Southern states hold that the provisions of the two are in conflict, and that TRIPS  
should be brought in line with the CBD. 
The third regime relevant in this context is the World Intellectual Property 
Organization (WIPO) of the UN. In general IPR regulation, it has become quite 
marginalized by TRIPS, since the latter can build on the DSM of the WTO to enforce 
compliance; in fact, one of the reasons for Northern states for founding TRIPS were 
enforcement problems under WIPO. WIPO governs a host of different treaties 
relevant to IPRs. In the context of genetic resources, these are: the Patent Law Treaty 
(PLT), the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) and the proposed Substantive Patent Law 
Treaty (SPLT), aiming at harmonizing IPRs on a global scale even beyond the 
requirements of TRIPS. A consultation process regarding genetic resources and 
Traditional Knowledge has been ongoing in WIPO’s Intergovernmental Committee 
(IGC) since 2003. In the context of this negotiation process, participants aim at the 
creation of an international regime / mechanism for the protection of Traditional 
Knowledge / Traditional Cultural Expressions and genetic resources. Negotiations 
within the IGC received a boost when the IGC’s mandate was renewed in 2009, with 
the aim of entering “text-based negotiations” in 2010. The creation of an international 
regime for protection of TK is envisaged in 2011. 
 
3. The EU’s external policy on Access and Benefit-Sharing 
 
The European Union has not developed a comprehensive internal framework for 
ABS, although some member states have passed legislation on their own. The focus 
of this work will be on the external ABS policy of the EU, that is, its policies towards 
the primary regimes regulating ABS on the international level. 
Until 2006, the EU’s position on ABS was more or less fragmented. During that 
period, member states believed that problems related to ABS and genetic resources 
could be resolved via a sole recourse to IPRs. Member states’ preferences were also 
diverging significantly; while those countries with a strong pharmaceutics industry 
(France, Britain, Germany, Italy) did not look to kindly on the compensatory 
mechanisms of the CBD, other countries were more oriented towards a developmental 
position accommodating the interests of the global South (Interview 1).  
In January 2006, the talks within ABSWG 4 stalled.  At COP8, taking place in March 
2006 in Curitiba, parties to the CBD agreed to set in place a deadline for finalizing the 
International Regime by 2010. Although the EU supported this decision, it 
nevertheless meant that internal coordination had to be intensified. 
Since about 2006, the EU possesses a more diversified external approach for ABS, 
which is being negotiated in TRIPS, WIPO and CBD simultaneously, the focus being 
of course the International Regime on ABS of the CBD. The Commission managed to 
put itself in the leading position; substantially drawing on epistemic communities, 
during 2006, the Commission was able to formulate a coherent and encompassing 
European policy on ABS, which the member states followed (Interview 1). The 
Commission also managed to propel itself onto center stage in the negotiations; in 
TRIPS and in the CBD, the Commission is the sole representative of the EU. 
The EU policy is here based on a multidimensional, multilateral approach. The model 
that the EU proposes is built upon several central components. First, the EU wishes to 
develop “international access standards” as a model legislation for other countries to 
adapt. International Access Standards, mentioned first at ABSWG 6, would provide 
guidelines for third parties to base their domestic ABS frameworks on. They would 
include measures to facilitate legal procedures between users and providers of genetic 
resources; access to resources for non-commercial purposes is to be facilitated; and 
whether additional compliance measures are appropriate in case of breach of a 
domestic ABS framework is to depend on whether this framework is in conformity 
with the international access standards. Thus compliance measures are directly linked 
to whether a party implements the international access standards. The rationale behind 
this is that it is difficult to enforce compliance under conditions of legal uncertainty. 
The standards would not require a harmonization of national laws and administrative 
procedures; but a mechanism is to be in place to monitor whether national regulations 
are in accordance with the access standards (CBD ABSWG 6 2008). 
Secondly, the EU ponders the possibility of enforcing compliance with domestic ABS 
frameworks and PIC through disclosure of origin of the respective genetic resource. 
This means that an applicant for a patent on a certain resource would have to provide 
documentary evidence on the whereabouts of his resource, thus checking compliance 
with domestic ABS frameworks and PIC. An international system is to be established 
which allows provider countries to globally track patent applications which make use 
of genetic resources found on their territory. Still, non-compliance with this 
requirement is not to negatively influence patentability, but should rather be a matter 
to be treated within civil law or via administrative procedures (i.e. fees); the granting 
of a patent should not be linked to whether a party complies with the disclosure 
requirement. 
Thirdly, the EU seems to be especially concerned with “misappropriation” of genetic 
resources, or what is being called “biopiracy”. Misappropriation is conceived of as 
acquiring a genetic resource in violation of the respective domestic ABS framework, 
that is, without PIC or in violation of MAT. The International Regime shall also apply 
to subsequent uses by an other party of misappropriated material. Users are to apply 
preventive measures as to ensure they are not using a pirated resource; measures 
against misappropriation shall also apply, if users fail to take these preventive steps. 
Sanctions against misappropriation shall be determined on the domestic level. Also,  
the EU distinguishes “misappropriation” from “misuse”, the latter constituting a 
breach of the MAT contract, an act which can already be persecuted under other 
international treaties.  
Thus, although no common internal ABS legislation exists, the EU has developed a 
diversified and comprehensive external governance model for ABS which is being 
pursued in three forums simultaneously. That the EU is in fact engaging in these three 
forums (CBD, WIPO, TRIPS) at the same time hints at the EU external governance 
model for ABS being the result of a substantial political compromise. In 
contradistinction, the US pursues its ABS policy primarily within TRIPS and, 
partially, within WIPO, thus displaying an approach to genetic resources primarily 
based on strong IPRs while neglecting the compensatory dimension. The European 
governance model for ABS, on the other hand, seems to be based on a fundamental 
compromise between northern interests in strengthening the biotechnological 
industry, and southern interests in compensatory arrangements. Thus, developmental, 
environmental and trade interests overlap. 
There are several reasons for this accommodating EU approach. First, the European 
biotech industry is distributed in an asymmetrical geographic way, which implies that 
not all countries have an interest in strengthening the respective industry through 
strong IPRs (Strasser and Redl 2010). Second, as far as the developmental aspect of 
ABS is concerned, the EU is globally the biggest donor of developmental aid, and 
houses three of the four “G0.7” countries, which have lived up to their promise of 
donoring 0.7 percent of GDP for developmental aid (Rabe 2003). Third, the EU 
understands its role in world politics as substantially multilateral and consensus-
based, which might also play a role for accommodating the positions of the global 
south.  
The EU envisages a functional division of labor between TRIPS, WIPO and CBD. 
Issues of Traditional Knowledge are to be strictly WIPO’s territory. The relationship 
between CBD and TRIPS is a further area of concern and it has long been on the 
agenda of the TRIPS council. The EU’s official position is, of course, that there is no 
conflict between the two regimes, arguing that state sovereignty over genetic 
resources does not preclude patenting; and patenting does not preclude benefit-
sharing arrangements. Still, the EU holds that the two regimes should be more fine-
tuned to each other. The EU considers disclosure of origin of genetic resources a 
crucial feature that would provide an “interface” between CBD and TRIPS. Through a 
potentially global disclosure system, the IPR system could be strengthened and 
compliance with benefit-sharing arrangements under the CBD be facilitated.  
 
4. Issue density in the EU’s submissions 
 
The respective coherence of the pre- and post-2006 output will here be measured via 
an ANOVA – based comparison of means of issue density. The analysis has to take 
into account the nature of the EU’s submissions, position papers and session 
protocols. In international negotiations, communication equals the pursuit of interests, 
that is, saying is doing. Without unambiguous communication with the negotiation 
partners, the attainment of policy goals becomes difficult. This leads me to the 
assumption, that the written and spoken communications of the EU are in a close fit 
with the EU’s actual preferences, which in turn allows to deduct (in)coherence of 
actual policy from the (in)coherence of communications. 
A rise in the level of policy coherence could theoretically have two reasons. First, as 
is hypothesized here, policy might become fundamentally reorganized, thus leading to 
a “leap” in the level of coherence. We might also expect policy coherence to be 
correlated to the time spent within negotiations; in this perspective, an actor would 
develop its position further and further as negotiations progress, in a gradual fashion. I 
will return to this point below.  
 Under “issue” I understand single political positions within a larger policy field. The 
sum of issues constitutes the political position of an actor. I understand the notion of 
“issues” in a formal rather than a substantial way. E.g., the issue “disclosure of origin 
of genetic resources” can take on several values, i.e. “disclosure should be a 
requirement for patentability” or “disclosure should not impact on patentability”. 
Here, it does not matter, what concrete values these variables assume; what is of 
relevance, instead, is how they are brought together within submissions. 
For the governance of ABS, I identified a total of 5 relevant issues. These are 
strengthening of procedures for Mutually Agreed Terms (MAT) possibly with the use 
of Material Transfer Agreements (MTAs); strengthening of Prior Informed Consent 
(PIC); Compliance measures; measures against misappropriation of genetic resources; 
and Disclosure of origin. These all occur over the whole time period under 
consideration. In 2006 / 2007, the issue of “international access standards” was 
created but not factored in so as not do distort the comparison.  
The sample was drawn from protocols of negotiations from and submissions to 
WIPO, CBD and TRIPS. From these, only those parts that contained spoken or 
written text by the EU, were selected; this selection was then reduced to those 
documents bearing relevance on ABS. A total of 27 documents thus made up the 
sample; 18 from 2002-2005, 9 from 2007-2010.  Testing the two samples for 
differences with ANOVA resulted in a statistically significant difference at the p = 
0.022 significance level. Whereas submissions in the 2002-2005 period had a mean 
score of 1,85 issues, this number rose to 3.38 in the latter period. Standard deviations 
were almost identical for both periods, with 1,31 and 1,32 respectively. Thus the 
relative distribution of issues stayed relatively constant, while only the mean score 
increased. 
Instead of assuming a structural break in 2006, we have to include the possibility of a 
learning process leading to linear growth over time: an alternative explanation for 
differences between pre- and post-2006 levels would be, that, as negotiations proceed, 
political positions become gradually refined by better linking together the disparate 
elements within the ABS field. This explanation would oppose the idea of a “leap” 
during 2006; instead, we should witness a constant growth from 2002 until 2010. 
In order to test this alternative explanation, it was tested how good linear, quadratic 
and cubic regression account for variance. With R-squared levels of 0.287 and 0.31, 
these 2nd and 3rd order regressions gave a better explanation than the linear 
regression (r-squared value of 0.216). This might be a cautious hint at issue density, 
indeed, taking a leap around 2006, but the small n-numbers preclude any quick 
jumping to conclusions. 
 
5. Cross-referencing in the EU’s submissions 
 
As mentioned, the existence of parallel regimes within a policy area increases the 
requirement for linking together the policies towards the different singular regimes. In 
this respect, coherence refers to the degree to which the policy towards a given regime 
takes into account the policies towards the other regimes within the complex. This 
inter-institutional coordination of policies between WIPO, CBD and TRIPS shall here 
be measured by the degree, to which a submission to a regime A refers to submissions 
to regimes B and C. Cross-referencing between submissions is here regarded as a 
measure, of how well the cross-institutional policies are linked. 
Still, the result of the ANOVA is, that with p = 0.3, the difference in means between 
the pre- and post-2006 phase is not significant. Further, the mean score of cross-
referencing between submissions goes down from 0.63 in the first period, to 0.38 in 
the second, although, with a p value that high, the relevance of this decrease in mean 
scores is questionable.  
6. Conclusion 
The paper aimed at measuring the development of the coherence of the EU’s 
submissions, position papers and session protocols to three international forums, 
taking issue density and cross-referencing as proxies for coherence. The paper set out 
to test, whether, as some data suggested, the qualitative reorientation of the EU’s 
policy on ABS in 2006 was reflected in the coherence of its submissions, leading to a 
leap in coherence levels during 2006.  
While issue density was higher post-2006 than before, the data suggests that this is 
not due to a linear increase. In light of the small n-numbers, caution in the 
interpretation of the results would be appropriate, but there are some hints, that issue 
density as a measure of policy coherence leaped during 2006. This would, indeed, 
hint at the coherence of the EU’s ABS policy becoming reorganized during 2006 
The second measure of coherence, cross-referencing between submissions, showed no 
statistically significant difference between the pre- and post-2006 phase, neither in the 
form of a gradual increase or a rupture, although the mean score halved. This result is 
out of line with the initial assumptions. Two possible explanations are in line, the first 
being that the decrease over time is rather due to chance, potentially resulting from 
small n-numbers. Secondly, since there seems to be no plausible reason why the 
development of the EU’s ABS policy should lead to a decrease in cross-referencing, 
the question is in order whether cross-referencing is actually a potent measure of 
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